Before Pandemic Preparations, We Need Better Evidence Of Risk
Written by Meryl Nass MD
The world is currently reorienting its health and social priorities to counter a perceived threat of increased pandemic risk.
Spearheaded by the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank, and the Group of 20 governments (G20), this agenda is based on claims of rapidly increasing infectious disease outbreaks (epidemics), driven largely by an escalating risk of major “spillover” of pathogens from animals (zoonosis).
To be globally prepared for such pandemic risk, many quarters have pushed for comprehensive and urgent action, to avert an “existential threat” to humanity.
It is prudent to prepare for public health emergencies and pandemic risk. It is also sensible to assure that these preparations are reflective of the best available evidence concerning pandemic risk, and that any policy response is proportional to that threat.
One hallmark of evidence-based policy is that policy decisions should be substantiated by rigorously established objective evidence and not based merely on ideology or common belief.
This enables appropriate allocation of resources among competing health and economic priorities. Global health resources are already scarce and stretched; there is little doubt that decisions about pandemic preparedness will have significant implications for global and local economies, health systems, and well-being.
So, What Is The Evidence On Pandemic Threat?
The G20 declarations from 2022 (Indonesia) and 2023 (New Delhi) are based on the findings of its High Level Independent Panel (HLIP), laid out in a 2022 report informed by the World Bank and the WHO, and analysis commissioned from a private data company, Metabiota, and the consulting firm McKinsey & Company.
The report summarizes the evidence in two annexes (Figure 1 below), noting in its Overview that:
“Even as we fight this pandemic [Covid-19], we must face the reality of a world at risk of more frequent pandemics.”
while on page 20:
“The last two decades have seen major global outbreaks of infectious diseases every four to five years, including SARS, H1N1, MERS and Covid-19. (See Annex D.)”
“There has been an acceleration of zoonotic spillovers over the last three decades. (See Annex E.)”
By “zoonotic spillovers,” the report refers to the passage of pathogens from animal hosts to the human population. This is the generally accepted origin of HIV/AIDS, the 2003 SARS outbreak, and seasonal influenza.
Zoonosis is assumed to be the major source of future pandemics, barring laboratory releases of pathogens modified by humans. The basis of the G20 HLIP report’s sense of urgency is these annexes (D and E) and their underlying data.
In other words, it is this evidence base that supports both the urgency of establishing robust global pandemic policies, and the level of investment that these policies should involve.
So, What Is The Quality Of The Evidence?
Despite the importance the HLIP report gives to the data in Annex D, there is actually little data to assess. The Annex presents a table of outbreaks and the years they occurred, with no attribution or source provided.
While Metabiota and McKinsey are quoted elsewhere as primary sources, the relevant McKinsey report does not include this data, and the data could not be found when conducting searches of publicly-available Metabiota material.
To better understand the implications from the data in Annex D, we created a corresponding “best-fit” table of pathogen outbreaks and year (Figure 1), with official mortality data for the entire outbreak per pathogen (some extend beyond 1 year – see sources in Table 1).
In order to address an apparent oversight in the Annex D table, we also included the 2018 and 2018-2020 Ebola outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of Congo in our analysis, since there were no large outbreaks of Ebola reported in 2017.
This is likely what “Ebola 2017” was intended to denote in the Annex D table. In our analysis (Figure 1) we exclude Covid-19 since its associated mortality remains unclear and its origin (laboratory-modified or natural) is contested, as discussed later.
When comparisons are made between the HLIP outbreaks table and our table of the last two decades, one mortality event dominates – the 2009 Swine Flu outbreak that resulted in an estimated 163,000 deaths. The next highest, the West African Ebola outbreak, resulted in 11,325 deaths.
Although these absolute numbers are worrisome, in terms of pandemic risk it is necessary to note that the Ebola virus requires direct contact for spread and is confined to Central and West Africa, where outbreaks arise every few years and are dealt with locally.
Furthermore, in relative terms, consider that malaria kills over 600,000 children every year, tuberculosis kills 1.3 million people, while seasonal influenza kills between 290,000 and 650,000.
So, putting Annex D in context, the West African Ebola outbreak, the largest in history, thus resulted in the equivalent of 4 days of global tuberculosis mortality, while the Swine flu outbreak of 2009 killed less than influenza normally does.
The third largest outbreak listed by the G20 HLIP was the cholera outbreak in 2010, which was confined to Haiti, and thought to have originated from poor sanitation in a United Nations compound.
Cholera once caused major outbreaks (peaking between 1852-1859) and was the subject of the first international agreements on pandemics. Improved water and sewage sanitation has reduced greatly to a point where the Haiti outbreak was unusual, and there has been a consistent overall downward trend since 1859.
In terms of threat, no other outbreak listed by the HLIP over the 2000-2020 period killed over 1,000 people. The HLIP considers this table to show major global outbreaks every 4-5 years, whereas it actually shows mostly small, localized outbreaks of illness dwarfed by the everyday infectious and non-infectious diseases that all countries deal with.
There were just 25,629 non-Swine flu and non-Covid-19 deaths over two decades from the outbreaks considered by the HLIP to be severe (it is noted that other outbreaks occurred through this period that the HLIP did not consider sufficiently significant).
Covid-19 has of course intervened – the first outbreak since 1969 to result in greater mortality than seasonal influenza does each year.
This mortality has occurred predominantly in the sick elderly, at a median age above 75 years in higher-mortality high-income countries, and in people with significant comorbidities, a contrast to the predominantly childhood deaths from malaria and young to middle-aged adults who die from tuberculosis.
Excess mortality rose over baseline but separating out Covid-19 mortality from mortality resulting from the ‘lockdown’ measures, reducing disease screening and management in high-income countries and promoting poverty-related diseases in low-income countries, makes actual burden estimates difficult.
However, if we accept Covid-19 (for sake of argument) as a natural event, then it should obviously be included when determining risk.
There are meaningful debates about the accuracy of how deaths were recorded and attributed to Covid-19, yet assuming the WHO is correct in its estimates, then the WHO records 7,010,568 deaths attributed to (or associated with) the SARS-CoV-2 virus over 4 years, with most in the first 2 years (Figure 2).
Allowing for population increase, this is still higher than the 1.0 to 1.1 million deaths attributed to the influenza outbreaks in 1957-58 and 1968-69, and the largest since the Spanish flu that inflicted a mortality several-fold higher over a century earlier.
With an average mortality of 1.7 million per year over 4 years, Covid-19 is not greatly different from tuberculosis (1.3 million), but concentrated in a considerably older age group.
Tuberculosis, however, continues before and will continue after Covid-19, whereas Figure 2 indicates a rapidly waning Covid-19 outbreak.
As the first event in 100 years of this magnitude, though little different from major endemic tuberculosis, and against a background that does not demonstrate an overall increase in mortality from outbreak events, it appears to be an outlier rather than evidence of a trend.
The second piece of evidence used by the HLIP to substantiate its claim that we are living in a “pandemic age” is research conducted by Metabiota Inc., an independent company whose epidemiology team has since been absorbed by Ginkgo Bioworks.
The Metabiota data forms Annex E of the HLIP report (see Figure 3), which shows outbreak frequency of zoonotic non-influenza pathogens over 60 years to 2020, and influenza ‘spillover’ events for 25 years.
Although Metabiota is cited as the source, the data itself is not further referenced. That said, an identical non-influenza data set appears in an online presentation by Metabiota to the Center for Global Development (CGD) on August 25th, 2021 (Figure 4).
This dataset also appears in a more recent academic article in the British Medical Journal in 2023, co-authored by Metabiota personnel (Meadows et al., 2023). The authors analyzed the Metabiota database of 3,150 outbreaks, including all outbreaks recorded by WHO since 1963 as well as “historically-significant” prior outbreaks (Figure 5).
The data used in Meadows et al. (2023) is available in the article’s supplementary information, and former Metabiota staff confirmed to REPPARE that the dataset used in that article, as in the earlier analyses, is now commercially available through Concentric by Ginkgo Bioworks.
The data points are summarized in the HLIP Annex E via two corresponding claims. Firstly, that there is an “exponential” increase in non-influenza outbreak frequency. Secondly, that influenza ‘spillover’ (transfer from animals) has increased from “almost none” in 1995 to around 10 events in 2020. Both claims require examination.
Yet, as Meadows and co-authors confirm in their later paper, this increase in reporting frequency does not take into account the development of new surveillance and diagnostic technologies, which have enabled better (or in some cases any) detection.
PCR testing was only invented in 1983 and has steadily become more accessible in laboratories over the last 30 years. Antigen and point-of-care serology tests were only widely available in the past couple of decades, and genetic sequencing only very recently.
Since 1960, we also have had significant improvements in road transport, clinic access, and digital information sharing. As a result, this limitation in the Meadows study raises a key issue.
Namely, that advancements in detection technology may account for the large increase in reported outbreaks, since most small and localized outbreaks will have been missed 60 years ago.
As just one example, HIV/AIDS was missed for at least 20 years before identification in the 1980s.
What the above suggests is that there are certainly known spillover effects and that these do occur with some frequency and deadly effect.
What is less reliable is the claim that there is an increased frequency of zoonosis and/or that the increase in reporting cannot be fully or partly explained by advancements in detection technologies.
https://principia-scientific.com/before-pandemics-we-need-better-evidence-of-risk/
********************************************************Also see my other blogs. Main ones below:
http://edwatch.blogspot.com (EDUCATION WATCH)
http://antigreen.blogspot.com (GREENIE WATCH)
http://pcwatch.blogspot.com (POLITICAL CORRECTNESS WATCH)
http://australian-politics.blogspot.com (AUSTRALIAN POLITICS)
http://snorphty.blogspot.com (TONGUE-TIED)
https://immigwatch.blogspot.com (IMMIGRATION WATCH)
https://awesternheart.blogspot.com (THE PSYCHOLOGIST)
http://jonjayray.com/blogall.html More blogs
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